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1.  Introduction 
This paper discusses the uncertain future of Member State BITs with third countries 
in the light of the developing EU investment policy. The question will be examined on 
the basis of the proposed  Regulation  establishing transitional arrangements for 
bilateral investment agreements between  Member States and third countries 
presented by the Commission on 7 July 2010
1  and the European Parliament’s 
Position adopted at first reading on 10 May 2011.
2 The proposed Regulation and the 
Commission Communication of the same day are meant to be the “first steps in the 
development of an EU international investment policy”.
3 
The  first chapters present the legal framework relevant for this question and its 
evolution to better understand the particular challenges of this transition process. The 
second chapter examines the relationship of EU law and investment law, with a brief 
introduction of the notion of investment law  and  the scope of the EU’s new 
investment  competence. The third chapter outlines the legal framework for the 
continuation and termination of treaties under international and EU law. The fourth 
chapter concerns BITs, first covering the particular nature of BITs and then the 
CJEU’s judgments in the BIT Cases of 2009. The fifth chapter consists of a step by 
step analysis of the different provisions of the proposed Regulation. 
2.  Investment Law 
2.1. The notion of investment law 
Investment law is the body of rules aiming to limit political risk and thereby foster 
foreign investment. It consists of customary international law and an extensive 
network of bilateral and multilateral investment agreements. The “silent revolution in 
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transitional arrangements for bilateral investment agreements between  Member States and third 
countries of 7 July 2010, COM(2010)344 final. 
2 European Parliament’s Position adopted on 10 May 2011, T7-0206/2011. 
3 Commission Communication “Towards a comprehensive European international investment policy” of 
July 7, 2010, COM(2010)343 final, p. 7.   3 
foreign investment law”
4 began in the 1960s with the conclusion of the first BITs
5 but 
started gaining its full momentum in the late 1990s
6 with the increasing resort by 
foreign investors to investment arbitration.
7 Due to the failure of the project for a 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment  in the late 1990s, BITs constitute the most 
significant part of investment agreements.
8 
Foreign investment, in particular FDI, has been playing an increasingly important role 
in the world economy since the 1980s. In the period of 1983-89, global FDI flows 
annually grew by 28,9%, four times as fast as the growth of world income and three 
times as fast as world trade, but with 81% of FDI flows directed to developed 
countries.
9 A significant rise of FDI directed towards developing countries began in 
the 1990s. Nonetheless, FDI in developed countries has remained very extensive 
and  economically highly important.
10  Thus,  developed countries such as the EU 
Member States have an interest in promoting foreign investment, as both capital 
exporting and capital importing countries. 
There is a broad consensus on the beneficial effects of FDI and a discussion of these 
goes beyond the scope of this paper. Investment law plays a decisive role both in 
attracting FDI
11 and in promoting investments abroad, strengthening the position of a 
country’s own investors.
12  A constant danger to investment law is the risk of 
politicisation of investment activity.
13 This in turn increases perceived political risk, 
which has a chilling effect on FDI, in particular by driving up costs for financing 
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investments.
14 Thus, investment law makes an important contribution to economic 
development by promoting and securing FDI flows. 
2.2. The scope of the EU’s competence for foreign direct investment after 
the Lisbon Treaty 
With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009, the importance of 
investment law is reflected in the EU’s exclusive competence for FDI,
15 which the 
Commission describes as “a new frontier for the common commercial policy”.
16 Art. 
207(1) TFEU now provides that “The common commercial policy shall be based on 
uniform principles, particularly with regard to changes in tariff rates, the conclusion of 
tariff and trade agreements relating to trade in goods and services, and the 
commercial aspects of intellectual property, foreign direct investment, the 
achievement of uniformity in measures of liberalisation, export policy and measures 
to protect trade such as those to be taken in the event of dumping or subsidies. [...]” 
(emphasis added) 
The central aim of this shift of competence is to enable the EU to benefit from the 
increased bargaining power that should enable the EU to “stand up to all major 
powers”
17 in future negotiations of investment agreements. The provision does not 
make reference to any particular kind of measures concerning foreign direct 
investments. Therefore, with a few exceptions,
18 the majority of authors suggest that 
for reasons of efficiency, the competence should be considered to encompass both 
investment promotion (i.e. liberalising market access for investors in the pre-
establishment phase) and investment protection (i.e. protecting the investment in the 
post-establishment phase).
19 For many decades, protection from expropriation has 
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been one of the central concerns of investment protection.
20 Some authors argue 
that competence regarding this field is precluded by Art. 345 TFEU
21 but the majority 
does not consider Art. 345  an obstacle to a Union competence for investment 
protection,
22 in particular in the light of the fact that the CJEU has interpreted the 
provision narrowly.
23  Therefore, the EU would be able to conclude investment 
agreements covering both market access and material standards of protection similar 
to those contained in most BITs.
24 
Art. 207 TFEU does not contain a definition of FDI. Numerous authors
25 suggest 
relying on Annex I of the Capital Liberalization Directive 88/361/EEC,
26 which defines 
direct investments as 
“investments of all kinds by natural persons or commercial, industrial 
or financial undertakings, and which serve to establish or to maintain 
lasting and direct links between the person providing the capital and 
the entrepreneur to whom or the undertaking to which the capital is 
made available in order to carry on an economic activity. This 
concept must therefore be understood in its widest sense.” 
Other reference points would be the OECD Benchmark Definition
27  or the IMF 
Balance of Payments Manual,
28 which both contain definitions of the term. FDI needs 
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43, at 46-47. 
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[1988] O.J.L178/11. 
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a resident enterprise in one economy (direct investor) in an enterprise (direct investment enterprise)   6 
to be distinguished from portfolio investments such as non-controlling  minority 
shares,  loans or bonds  only committed on  a short-term basis.
29  However, such 
investments  have been found to constitute investments in the sense of Art. 25 
ICSID
30 by numerous investment tribunals
31 and are equally covered by most BITs 
and investment agreements.
32 
The  use of the term “FDI” indicates  that the exclusive competence for foreign 
investment does not extend to portfolio investments.
33This was also affirmed by the 
German Constitutional Court, which explicitly referred to the scope of the FDI 
competence in its Lisbon Treaty judgment, stating that  
“Much, however, argues in favour of assuming that the term ‘foreign 
direct investment’ only  encompasses investment which serves to 
obtain a controlling interest in an enterprise (see Tietje, Die 
Außenwirtschaftsverfassung der EU nach dem Vertrag von Lissabon, 
2009, pp. 15–16). The consequence of this would be that exclusive 
competence only exists for investment of this type whereas 
investment protection agreements that go beyond this would have to 
be concluded as mixed agreements.”
34 
                                                                                                                                                                      
which is resident in an economy other than that of the direct investor. The lasting interest implies the 
existence of a long-term relationship between the direct investor and the direct investment enterprise 
and a significant degree of influence on the management of the enterprise. See OECD, Benchmark 
Definition of Foreign Direct Investment, 4th ed. (2008), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/26/50/40193734.pdf (accessed on 18 April 2012). 
28 Which defines “direct investment” as reflecting the objective of obtaining a lasting interest by an entity 
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degree of influence by the investor on the management of the enterprise. See  IMF,  Balance of 
Payment Manual, 5th ed. (1993), available at: www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/bopman/bopman.pdf 
(accessed on 18 April 2012). 
29
  J.-P.  LAVIEC,  Protection et promotion des investissements : étude du droit international 
économique(1985), p. 28. 
30 Which provides that “The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out 
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established?' (2011) 6 Global Trade and Customs Journal 75; J. HO, “The Meaning of ‘Investment’ in 
ICSID Arbitrations”, (2010) 26 Arbitration International 633. 
32  For example in Art. 1 of the United States Model BIT of 2004, available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/U.S.%20model%20BIT.pdf(accessed on 18 April 2012); also 
see  P.  MUCHLINSKI,  “The Framework of Investment Protection: The Content of BITs”, in  K.P. 
SAUVANT, L.E. SACHS (eds.), The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral Investment 
Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and Investment Flows (2009), p. 37, at 40. 
33
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34  German Constitutional Court, Lisbon Treaty, Judgment of 30 June 2009, available at 
www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208en.html (accessed on 
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It can be expected that Member States will strongly oppose attempts to extend, in 
practice, the competence to portfolio investments, a position in which they are thus 
supported by the looming threat of a German Constitutional Court judgment holding 
Union acts with respect to portfolio investments ultra vires. 
However, the Commission Communication seems to suggest that the EU investment 
competence under Art. 207 TFEU extends to all forms of investment, referring to the 
ability of the EU “to continue promoting investment, both direct investment and 
portfolio investment”.
35  Indeed,  an exclusion of portfolio investments  would be a 
serious obstacle for developing a comprehensive EU investment policy, as they are 
“inextricably linked in many bilateral agreements to direct investment”.
36  Recent 
trends in investment law are considered to have made the distinction increasingly 
obsolete.
37  EU investment protection agreements excluding portfolio investments 
would  thus  provide significantly less protection than standard  BITs  and thus not 
constitute a satisfactory replacement of Member State BITs.  
One solution for this dilemma may be implied shared external competences. It has 
been argued that the EU could conclude international investment agreements also 
applying to such investments (as is usually the case in most BITs) based on implied 
shared external competences.
38 Art. 216(1) TFEU together with Art. 3(2) TFEU are 
considered a codification of the CJEU’s case law on implied exclusive competences, 
but do not codify or otherwise affect implied shared competences.
39 The requirement 
for the exercise of implied shared external competences is that concluding an 
agreement with a third country would facilitate the exercise of an internal EU 
competence. Exercising a shared external competence over portfolio investments 
would facilitate the exercise of internal competences since otherwise, the overlap of 
BIT provisions on portfolio investments and EU law would negatively affect the 
effectiveness of the EU’s of internal competences.
40 This would mean that, on the 
one hand, Member States would continue to be able to conclude BITs applicable to 
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BUNGENBERGet al. (eds.), International Investment Law and EU Law (2011), p. 43, at 49. 
38
 A. DIMOPOULOS, EU Foreign Investment Law (2011), p. 104; S. HINDELANG, N. MAYDELL, “The EU’s 
Common Investment Policy –  Connecting the Dots”, in  M.  BUNGENBERGet al.(eds.),  International 
Investment Law and EU Law  (2011), p. 1, at 24; for  the  opposite  view,  see  C.  TIETJE, “Die 
Außenwirtschaftsverfassung der EU nach dem Vertrag von Lissabon”, Beiträge zum 
Transnationalen Wirtschaftsrecht No. 83, Halle 2009, p. 16; T. EILMANSBERGER, “Bilateral investment 
treaties and EU law”, (2009) 46 CMLRev. 383, at 392. 
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BUNGENBERGet al. (eds.), International Investment Law and EU Law (2011), p. 1, at 15, 17. 
40 Ibid., at 25.   8 
portfolio investments alone  and on the other hand, the EU would not need to 
conclude agreements covering foreign investment in its entirety as a mixed 
agreement, but could do so on its own.
41 
How the Commission and Member States will finally address this problem remains to 
be seen, although the most likely option would be to continue the Commission’s drive 
for  Comprehensive  Economic and Trade  Agreements (concluded as mixed 
agreements) covering numerous aspects including investment protection. In the light 
of the numerous problems and controversies concerning the scope of this new 
competence, it has been correctly observed that only “one thing is clear: the transfer 
of FDI competence from the Member States to the EU has been done without 
considering the far-reaching consequences and legal difficulties that are associated 
with such a move.”
42 
3.  Continuation and termination of treaties 
This section discusses the legal framework for the continuation and terminations of 
treaties under international and EU law, which forms the background of the proposed 
Regulation. It is precisely the lack of a comprehensive and coordinated framework 
between these two fields of law that contributes to legal uncertainty concerning the 
future of Member State BITs and thus the urgency for the transitional framework that 
the proposed Regulation aims to create. 
3.1. Continuation and termination of treaties under international treaty law 
The termination of BITs between Member States and third States is subject to the 
customary rules of treaty law enshrined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (VCLT). The Convention’s lex posterior principle can only apply to intra-EU 
BITs.
43 With respect to BITs with third States, EU law cannot affect the rights of third 
States and the corresponding obligations of the Member States.
44 
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 A. DIMOPOULOS, EU Foreign Investment Law (2011), p. 104-105; S. HINDELANG, N. MAYDELL, “The EU’s 
Common Investment Policy – Connecting the Dots”, in M. BUNGENBERGet al. (eds.), International 
Investment Law and EU Law (2011), p. 1, at 26. 
42
 N. LAVRANOS, “New Developments in the Interaction between International Investment Law and EU 
Law”, (2010) 9 Law & Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 409, at 440. 
43  Art. 59, Vienna Convention  on the Law of Treaties 1969, available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf(accessed on 18 April 
2012) 
44 Arts. 30(4), 34, 39 VCLT; Art. 351 TFEU effectively affirms this principle; with regard to an application 
of Art. 27 VCLT, which prohibits States from invoking provisions of their internal law as justification 
for its failure to perform a treaty, to incompatibilities of BITs with EU law, see M. LICKOVA, “European 
Exceptionalism in International law”, (2008) 19 EJIL  463, at 470; A.A.  GHOURI, “Resolving   9 
Unless Member States are able to rely on exceptional grounds for termination,
45 they 
would either have to terminate their BITs in conformity with its own provisions or by 
obtaining consent from the third State.
46 When BITs contain provisions regarding 
termination, the right to terminate is usually subject to a twelve months’ notice.
47 
Where the BIT contains no such provision, it could only be denounced, also subject 
to a twelve months’ notice, where it is established that the parties intended to admit 
such possibility or were the nature of the treaty implies such right.
48 
3.2. Continuation and termination of treaties under EU law 
The application of EU law does not affect the obligation of Member States to respect 
rights of third countries under previous agreements. In Burgoa, the CJEU held that 
pursuant to Art. 351 TFEU [ex. 234 EC], the application of the Treaty does not affect 
the duty to observe the rights of non-member countries under an agreement 
concluded prior to the entry into force of the Treaty or accession, and that the 
Community institutions are bound not to impede the performance of those 
obligations.
49 
In Commission v. Portugal [2000], the Court affirmed this, holding that  
“the purpose of the first paragraph of Article 234 of the Treaty is to 
make it clear, in accordance with the principles of international law 
[...], that application of the EC Treaty is not to affect the duty of the 
Member State concerned to respect the rights of third countries 
under a prior agreement and to perform its obligations thereunder.”
50 
Consequently, a Member State must in all cases respect the rights which the third 
country derives from the agreement, but at the same time, it is under an obligation to 
denounce the agreement if it contains un-adjustable incompatibilities with EU law.
51 If 
the respective agreement expressly enables the contracting parties to denounce it, 
the Member State cannot invoke foreign-policy interests to delay denouncing the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Incompatibilities of Bilateral Investment Treaties of the EU Member States with the EC Treaty: 
Individual and Collective Options”, (2010) 16 ELJ 806, at 815. 
45  Under Arts. 61 (Supervening impossibility of performance) or 62 (Fundamental change of 
circumstances). The latter option has been discussed but seems highly unlikely, see LAVRANOS, 
supra note 42, at 422. 
46 Art. 54 VCLT. 
47
 A. CARSKA-SHEPPARD, “Issues Relevant to the Termination of Bilateral Investment Treaties”, (2009) 26 
JIA 755, at 760. 
48 Art. 56 VCLT. 
49 Case 812/79 Burgoa [1980] ECR 2787, para. 11. 
50 Case C-84/98 Commission v. Portugal [2000], ECR I-5215, para. 53. 
51 Ibid., 54, 58.   10 
agreement.
52 This would be the case with respect to most BITs, which, as noted 
above, usually allow parties to denounce with twelve months’ notice. 
The rights of those third countries, corresponding to obligations of the respective 
Member State, remain unaffected – but the rights of the Member State under the 
agreement may very well be restricted under EU Law, which may preclude the 
Member State from exercising that right. For Example, in Commission v. Italy, [1962] 
Italy’s right under GATT to charge a higher rate of duty conflicted with rights of other 
Member States and consequently, Italy was precluded from exercising that right.
53 
 
The fate of pre-accession agreements must be distinguished from agreements 
whose subject matter did not fall within the scope of an exclusive Union competence 
at the time of their conclusion, but came within the scope due to  a  subsequent 
change of the Treaty provisions. Under international law, such shifts of competence 
equally fall under the “pacta tertiis” principle and thus cannot affect the rights of third 
States.
54 The consequences of the shift under EU law are not clear.
55 
The possibility of applying Art. 351 TFEU by analogy to cases of supervening 
external competence is contentious.
56 In his Opinion in Open Skies, AG Tizzano held 
that concerning compatibility in terms of competence (opposed to the separate 
question of compatibility with specific provisions of the Treaty), “supervening external 
competence of the Community in matters previously regulated by agreements of the 
Member States does not suffice in itself to render those agreements incompatible 
with the rules and principles governing the division of powers”.
57  In her Opinion 
Intertanko, AG Kokott stated that “Member States cannot in principle invoke 
agreements concluded after accession as against Community law”
58 but cautiously 
added, referring to the Open Skies  judgment
59  that the respective jurisprudence 
                                                            
52 Ibid., paras. 55, 59; also see Case C-216/01 BudĕjovickýBudvar [2003], ECR I-13617, para. 171. 
53 Case 10/61 Commission v.Italy, [1962] ECR 1, at 10; also see Case C-324/93 Evans Medical [1995] 
ECR I-563, para.27; Case C-124/95 Centro-Com [1997] ECR-I -00081, para. 56. 
54 See supra note 44. 
55
 F. ORTINO, P. EECKHOUT, “Towards and EU Policy on Foreign Direct Investment”, in A. BIONDI et al. 
(eds.), EU Law After Lisbon (2011), p. 312, at 320.  
56 For a strong rejection of the analogous application see, in particular, A. DIMOPOULOS, EU Foreign 
Investment Law (2011), p. 306. 
57 Opinion of AG Tizzano in Case C-466/98 Commission v. United Kingdom [2002] ECR I-9427, para. 
113. 
58 Opinion of AG Kokott in Case C-308/06 Intertanko and Others [2008] ECR I-04057, para. 77. 
59 Case C-466/98 Commission v United Kingdom (‘open skies’) [2002] ECR I-9427, paras. 26, 27.   11 
“applies at least where the relevant Community powers already existed at the time 
the agreement was concluded.”
60 
Thus, the position indicated by the Advocate Generals and supported by a majority of 
authors,
61  is that a supervening external EU competence would not render 
agreements previously concluded with third countries incompatible with the division 
of powers between the Member States and the EU. The agreements would therefore 
remain in force and compatible with EU law, but the Member States would be under 
an obligation to adjust or terminate the agreements in so far as their content is 
incompatible with specific provisions of EU law.
62 However, in the light of the very 
extensive understanding of incompatibility with EU law which the CJEU embraced in 
the BITs cases in 2009, the impact of this distinction may be limited.
63 
3.3. Continuation and termination of treaties under the Council decisions on 
pre-existing trade agreements 
A legal source “clearly  inspiring the Commission proposal” were the two Council 
decisions issued in 1961 and 1969 in connection with the full entry into force of the 
CCP.
64 The Council Decision of 9 October 1961 provided for a 12 year transitional 
period pursuant to Arts. 8 and 111 EEC  and  prohibited Member States from 
concluding trade agreements valid beyond that transitional period.
65  Trade 
agreements neither foreseeing the entry into force of the CCP nor allowing an annual 
notice of termination would have to be terminated within one year of the issuing of 
the decision.
66 In doing so, Member States were to coordinate their action to agree 
on coinciding termination dates with each affected third State.
67  During the 
transitional period, Member States and the Commission were to jointly  examine 
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BUNGENBERGet al. (eds.), International Investment Law and EU Law (2011), p. 55, at 67 
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whether the trade agreements still in force constituted obstacles to the introduction of 
the CCP.
68 
The Council Decision of 29 December 1969 introduced a more flexible system,
69 
allowing the Commission to propose to the Council to authorise the extension of the 
agreement for a specified period, if it found the agreement not to constitute  an 
obstacle to the implementation of the CCP.
70  The practice of the Commission in 
applying the decisions was characterised by restraint in finding obstacles to the CCP, 
allowing Member States to maintain many trade agreements in force for 35 years 
until the final expiry of the authorisations in 2005.
71 
4.  Bilateral Investment Treaties 
This chapter shall briefly outline the particular features and functions of BITs and the 
2009 judgments of the CJEU on the compatibility of certain BIT provisions with EU 
law. The impacts of the transitional framework envisaged by the proposed Regulation 
must be considered taking into account these particular features, such as the crucial 
importance of legal certainty under BITs and the perceived fields of conflict between 
EU law provisions affecting foreign investments and BIT protection. 
4.1. The particular nature of BITs 
BITs are, in the words of the Commission, “[t]he most visible manifestation of 
Member States’ policies on investment over the last 50 years”.
72 The first BIT was 
signed between Germany and Pakistan in 1959 and entered into force in 1962.
73 
Since then, Germany has acted as a global leader in terms of BIT diplomacy, 
concluding around 130 BITs worldwide, followed by the United Kingdom, Italy and 
France with around 100 BITs each.
74 The main purpose of BITs is to resolve the 
dynamic inconsistency problem, that is, the problem that as a sovereign entity, the 
host State can subsequently change national rules and violate assurances given to 
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the investor.
75 This is achieved through binding commitments of the host State, which 
the investor can enforce through dispute settlement mechanisms beyond the control 
of the host State. BITs thus aim to “immunize” foreign investors from subsequent 
political changes and their impacts on economic policies.
76  In the light of this 
function, lack of legal certainty strikes at the very heart of BIT protection. 
The two elements distinguishing contemporary  BITs from previous bilateral 
agreements concerning investment are the widespread use of MFN and arbitration 
clauses.
77 MFN clauses provide that the host State shall grant foreign investors from 
the other State all benefits granted to any other foreign investors under other 
investment agreements. Arbitration clauses typically contain an offer by the host 
State to submit to investor-State arbitration in case of a dispute arising out of an 
investment. This  grants  foreign investors an effective and reliable mechanism to 
enforce claims against the host State, insulating them from possible deficiencies of 
the local judicial system.
78 Arbitration has also played a decisive role in depoliticising 
investment disputes.
79  As stated by an ICSID tribunal in Gas Natural SDG v. 
Argentina, such a provision “offered to foreign investors assurances that disputes 
that might flow from their investments would not be subject to the perceived hazards 
of delays and political pressures of adjudication”
80 in national courts. In many cases, 
it is only thanks to this mechanism that companies are willing to invest in the first 
place, as political risks are mitigated by the possibility of receiving compensation 
before international investment tribunals.
81 
 
                                                            
75
 A. GUZMAN, “Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties” in K.P. SAUVANT, L.E. SACHS 
(eds.), The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Double 
Taxation Treaties, and Investment Flows (2009), p. 73, at 78-79. 
76
  TIM  BÜTHE AND HELEN  V.  MILNER, “Bilateral Investment Treaties and Foreign Direct Investment: A 
Political Analysis”, in  K.P.  SAUVANT,  L.E.  SACHS  (eds.),  The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct 
Investment: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and Investment Flows (2009), 
p. 171, at 182. 
77
 LAVRANOS, supra note 42, at 413; C.E. ANDERER, “Bilateral Investment Treaties and the EU Legal 
Order: Implications of the Lisbon Treaty”, (2010) 35 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 851, at 
859. 
78  For example, enforcing a contract via local courts in Bangladesh takes an average 1,442 days 
opposed to an average of 351 days within the OECD countries. See  S.P.  SUBEDI,  International 
Investment Law (2008), p. 81, quoting a report on “Business and Governance”, Financial Times, 14 
March 2007, p. 5. 
79 JOHANNSEN, supra note 21, p. 32. 
80 Gas Natural SDG v the Argentine Republic, Decision on Jurisdiction of 17 June 2005, available at 
http://www.asil.org/pdfs/GasNat.v.Argentina.pdf (accessed on 6 May 2011), para. 29. 
81
 S.P. SUBEDI, International Investment Law (2008), p. 217; E. AISBETT, “Bilateral Investment Treaties 
and Foreign Direct Investment: Correlation Versus Causation”, in K.P. SAUVANT, L.E. SACHS (eds.), The 
Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, 
and Investment Flows (2009), p. 395, at 395.   14 
4.2. The 2009 BIT cases 
In 2009, the CJEU proved that Art. 351(2) TFEU can be “a rather sharp tool”
82 by 
finding that the BITs of Austria, Sweden and Finland with third countries infringed EU 
law. The Commission had initiated infringement proceedings as it considered clauses 
guaranteeing investors the free transfer of payments connected with an investment 
capable of impeding the application of Council measures restricting the free 
movement of capital and payments under Arts. 64(2), 66 and 75 TFEU. A foreign 
investor affected by such measures, for example the freezing of assets used for 
financing terrorist activities, could therefore circumvent EU measures by invoking the 
BIT and thereby undermine the effectiveness of measures essential for combating 
international terrorism.
83 
No such measures had actually been taken by the Council and the case concerned 
the mere potential risk of conflict between obligations under the BITs and EU law.
84 
Nonetheless, the CJEU found that the mere existence of BIT provisions capable of 
undermining the practical effectiveness of such measures already constituted an 
infringement of EU law.
85 By basing itself on the mere existence of such provisions, 
the CJEU embraced a broad understanding of incompatibility.
86This approach has 
been criticized as going too far, as it extends the obligation of Member States to 
eliminate incompatibilities “at a stage when a conflict has not even materialized”.
87 
The Member States argued that they would, in case of an actual conflict of 
obligations,  fulfil  their obligations under EU law by entering into  negotiations to 
modify the BITs with respect to the relevant clauses on transfer of payments. The 
CJEU  rejected these arguments, finding that negotiations were neither quick nor 
reliable enough to meet the requirement of practical effectiveness.
88  All Member 
States would have to be capable of applying the Council measures immediately, 
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rather than having recourse to lengthy  negotiations.
89  The Commission had also 
initiated infringement proceedings against Denmark, but Denmark succeeded in 
satisfying the Commission’s demands by immediately terminating its respective BIT 
with Indonesia and renegotiating a new BIT with a clause allowing Denmark to in 
eventu apply such Council measures.
90 
The judgments have serious repercussions for the three Member States concerned, 
but also for all other Member States who have concluded  similar BITs with third 
countries. For the three defendant Member States the judgment means that they will 
rapidly have to modify their agreements and ultimately, should the third countries be 
unwilling to accept such modifications (since  the free transfer of payments  is  a 
guarantee of essential importance to foreign investors
91), be obliged to terminate 
those BITs.
92 It should be kept in mind that most BITs contain clauses extending the 
protection provided therein for years after their termination, thus exposing Member 
States to damages claims from investors affected by such Council measures long 
after the original BIT was terminated.
93 
For the other Member States the judgment  means that all BITs containing such 
clauses are at risk of being brought before the CJEU  in future infringement 
proceedings, as the Court explicitly stated that the incompatibilities of BITs with the 
Treaty it had found “not limited to the Member State which is the defendant in the 
present case”.
94 Thus, they would need to modify their existing BITs to include a 
REIO  (Regional Economic Integration Organisation)  clause, which provides for a 
reservation in favour of obligations arising out of regional economic integration.
95 
5.  The proposed Regulation 
This chapter examines the proposed Regulation at its current stage in the legislative 
process: The Commission made its  proposal  on  7 July 2010,
96  followed by EP 
Rapporteur Schlyter’s Draft Report of 18 November 2010, the Draft Legislative 
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Resolution  of the Committee on International Trade  of 13 April 2011
97  and  the 
European Parliament’s Position  adopted at first reading on 10 May  2011.
98  The 
European Parliament’s Position confirmed the Draft Legislative Resolution adopted 
by the Committee on International Trade in all relevant points, merely removing two 
short passages in Recital No. 5.
99 
The Regulation’s object and purpose is to “authorise the continued existence of all 
investment agreements currently in force between  Member States and third 
countries” and aims to provide for “an explicit guarantee of legal certainty as regards 
the conditions under which investors operate”.
100 The Commission affirms that any 
legal uncertainty on the status and validity of these agreements would go “against the 
core rationale of investment protection, i.e. to provide legal certainty on the behaviour 
of host countries”.
101 Indeed, continued legal uncertainty in this field would “make it 
difficult for the EU to attract new foreign investors who will likely forego opportunities 
in the EU to avoid the problems associated with an unstable investment regime”.
102 
The Commission wants to pursue “an evolutionary handling of the entry into force of 
the TFEU, much like the introduction of the common commercial policy in the 
1960s”
103  allowing a  “gradual formulation and elaboration of an EU investment 
policy”.
104  However,  the proposal does not address the objectives, criteria and 
content of that new policy, which are reserved to the separate Commission 
Communication.
105 
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5.1. Subject matter and scope (Art. 1) 
Art. 1 provides that the Regulation “establishes the terms, conditions and the 
procedure under which Member States are authorised to maintain in force, amend or 
conclude” BITs with third countries. The Regulation thus completely excludes from its 
scope  intra-EU BITs.
106  The main reason for this is that the exclusive FDI 
competence in Art. 207 is understood as part of the CCP and thus does not cover 
investment agreements within the EU.  These are currently subject of informal 
negotiations between the Commission and Member States.
107 Although this debate 
also contributes to undermining legal certainty and investor confidence, both sides 
seem to prefer biding their time: The Commission may hope for individual Member 
States to push for the termination of BITs, such as the recent termination campaign 
undertaken by the Czech Republic, which has already led to the termination of its 
BITs with Italy and Denmark.
108 Member States reluctant to give up their BITs, on the 
other hand, may wait for further awards rejecting EU law based arguments against 
the validity of BITs such as Eastern Sugar and Eureko.
109 
The Parliament’s Position does not propose any changes on Art. 1, but amends the 
recitals to state  the importance of  ensuring the best possible protection for EU 
investors and legal certainty, notwithstanding  the  only  transitional validity of BITs 
concluded by Member States.
110 This emphasis on the validity of BITs and ensuring 
rights of investors and legal certainty indicates that authorisations should only be 
withdrawn as a last resort. 
5.2. The notification procedure to maintain agreements in force(Art. 2-3) 
Member States shall notify the Commission, within thirty days of entry into force of 
the Regulation, of all their BITs with third countries that they either wish to maintain in 
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force or permit to enter into force.
111 All BITs notified are automatically authorised 
and remain in force.
112 
Rapporteur Schlyter proposed to add that Art. 3 can authorise maintaining in force 
agreements only for a period of eight years after the entry into force of the Regulation 
because it would otherwise “allow the emergence of parallel, potentially incompatible 
investment regimes, thus adding to legal uncertainty” and contradicting the effective 
implementation of Article 207(1) of the TFEU.
113  This criticism is not convincing, 
because the policy choice is between the risk of parallel (or double) protection and 
the risk of no protection at all. It is evident that when it comes to legal certainty to 
foreign investors, the real concern is the latter, namely an end of BIT protection 
before proper Union agreements are in place. 
The Parliament’s Position clearly rejects this thrust to reducing the temporal scope of 
the Regulation, leaving Art. 3 unchanged and instead extending the deadline for the 
state of play reports, thus further postponing an eventual termination of the 
authorisation system.
114 
5.3. Review of agreements (Art. 5) 
5.3.1.  The Commission’s review criteria 
Art. 5 provides that the Commission is to review notified agreements by assessing, in 
particular, whether the agreements: 
“(a) conflict with the law of the Union other than the incompatibilities 
arising from the allocation of competences between the Union and its 
Member States, or 
(b) overlap, in part or in full, with an agreement of the Union in force 
with that third country and this specific overlap is not addressed in 
the latter agreement, or 
(c) constitute an obstacle to the development and the implementation 
of the Union's policies relating to investment, including in particular 
the common commercial policy.” 
The review is to be based on “quantitative and qualitative aspects of the agreements 
in place, as well as the possible obstacles the agreements could present to the 
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implementation of the common commercial policy”, in particular the undermining of 
on-going negotiations between the Union and a third country.
115 The first of the three 
criteria  is self-explanatory.  The second criterion relates to cases of overlap with 
Union agreements in the absence of a clause regulating the specific overlap in the 
latter. It has been criticized  that the criterion relates to mere “overlaps”, which in 
themselves do not necessarily constitute incompatibilities with EU law, and thereby 
goes beyond what is necessary in the review process.
116 
The third criterion is the widest and potentially most contentious one. It refers to 
cases where “agreements constitute an obstacle to the development and the 
implementation of  the  Union's policies relating to investment”. According to the 
Commission, an  agreement might, by its very existence, already  constitute an 
obstacle to EU investment policy, in particular if “the existence of agreements 
undermines the willingness of a third country to negotiate with the Union”.
117 As this 
statement already implies, this provision would grant the Commission a broad margin 
of discretion for “attacking” Member State agreements with third countries envisaged 
for negotiations of Union agreements. 
Unsurprisingly, the third criterion relating to obstacles to the EU investment policy 
has been criticized. Due to its vagueness, it has been accused of functioning as a 
“carte blanche” for the Commission to attack BITs on virtually any grounds and with 
consequently limited possibilities of judicial control.
118 
5.3.2.  The Parliament’s amendments 
The Parliament’s Position contains four important amendments  to the review 
process: First, it replaces “shall review” by “may review” in the first paragraph, 
thereby acknowledging that due to the wide scope of the notification obligation, many 
BITs notified may be “harmless” and not require a special review under the 
Regulation.
119  This would also allow the Commission to concentrate on truly 
problematic BITs and avoid significant delays resulting from the administrative 
overload of reviewing in detail all BITs notified to it within thirty days after the entry 
into force of the Regulation.
120 
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Second,  Parliament’s Position specifies that the “incompatibilities arising from the 
allocation of competences between the Union and its Member States” must concern 
the competence on foreign direct investment, and thereby limits the scope of the 
provision.
121 Third, the draft resolution removes the overlap criterion in (b), which is 
instead to be addressed in Art. 6, which provides that authorisation “shall be 
withdrawn where the Union has already ratified an agreement with the same third 
country relating to investment negotiated by the Commission.”
122 This removes legal 
uncertainty as to how the Commission may interpret an “overlap, in part or in full” and 
ensures that if the Union concludes an agreement relating to investment, this shall be 
the only legal basis for investment protection. 
Fourth, the draft resolution restricts the scope of the third criterion, by raising the 
threshold to agreements constituting “serious obstacles”.
123 Furthermore, they must 
be obstacles to “the conclusion of future Union agreements  with third countries 
relating to investment” rather than merely to the development and implementation of 
EU investment policy.
124  The latter specification would significantly restrict the 
Commission’s margin of discretion: In particular, it would not be sufficient for an 
agreement to merely reduce the incentives for a third State to conclude a Union 
agreement,  as had been originally suggested by the Commission.
125  This would 
render  the Commission’s withdrawal practice both more predictable and more 
accessible to judicial control. Overall, this amendment seems helpful and capable of 
addressing concerns about an excessive margin of discretion otherwise granted to 
the Commission, which would inevitably constitute an obstacle to acceptance by the 
Council. 
5.3.3.  The state of play reports 
Art. 5 also provides for a reporting system, under which the Commission shall, within 
five years, report to the European Parliament and the Council on the application of 
the Chapter and the need for its continued application. Should the report recommend 
to discontinue the application or to modify the provisions, it shall be accompanied by 
an appropriate legislative proposal. In particular, such a legislative proposal would 
have to clarify the legal position of agreements the amendment  or  termination  of 
which is not consented to by the third country. Thus, a termination of the 
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authorisation system could only occur with the consent of the Council and European 
Parliament. Until that moment, investors can trust in the continued validity of BITs 
unless the Commission finds the specific BIT in violation of one of the criteria 
enumerated in Art. 5(1).
126 
This cautious approach did not find the approval of Rapporteur Schlyter, who instead 
proposed an Article providing for expiry of the entire Regulation within eight years 
after its entry into force. By that time “all existing bilateral agreements of Member 
States with third countries shall be replaced by an agreement of the Union 
concerning investment”.
127  An extension of application could be granted by the 
European Parliament and the Council based on a report on the progress achieved in 
the replacement of Member State BITs presented by the Commission, however, such 
extension would be limited to a period of no longer than five years.
128 
This proposal appears  fundamentally misconceived. The wording of the first part 
already indicates a problematic understanding of international negotiations: By 
requesting that “Member State BITs shall be replaced by a Union agreement”, the 
Rapporteur seems to ignore the fact it takes two not only to tango, but also to 
conclude international agreements. Even in the highly unlikely case that the over 150 
third States which are currently tied to Member States in over 1.200 different BITs
129 
were eager to replace these agreements within eight years, it seems illusionary that 
the Commission could master the colossal task of completing negotiations with so 
many States within eight years.
130 A replacement of all Member State BITs by Union 
agreements is neither realistic within eight nor within thirteen years (in case of the 
possible five year extension).  The only consequence of the proposed procedure 
would be that it would allow the European Parliament to exercise pressure over the 
Commission by threatening the “end of all BITs”. 
However, Rapporteur Schlyter’s call on the European Parliament to restrict “the co-
existence of BITs with the emergence of EU international investment treaties” was 
not heeded. Quite to the contrary, the European Parliament extended the originally 
envisaged maximum five year delay for the Commission’s state of play report to ten 
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years,
131 acknowledging that replacing Member State BITs by Union agreements will 
be a lengthy process. 
5.4. Withdrawal of authorisation(Art. 6) 
Art. 6(1) provides for the criteria under which the authorisation provided for in Article 
3 may be withdrawn. The first three criteria mirror those set out in Art. 5. The fourth 
criterion states that authorisation may be withdrawn where “the Council has not taken 
a decision on the authorisation to open negotiations on an agreement which 
overlaps, in part or in full, with an agreement notified under Article 2, within one year 
of the submission of a recommendation by the Commission pursuant to Article 218(3) 
of the Treaty.” 
Commentators have referred to the clause as a “blackmail provision”
132  and 
“vendetta clause”
133  allowing the Commission to exercise pressure on Member 
States hindering Council decisions on the authorisation to open negotiations. If the 
Commission indeed relied on the provision to withdraw authorisation of a bilateral 
agreement in full knowledge that there will be no Union agreement to replace it in the 
near future, the decision would directly weaken the legal protection of EU investors, 
thus running counter to the very purpose of EU investment policy.
134 Such action 
would severely undermine  confidence of investors in the capacity and  even the 
willingness of the Union to protect EU investors. It would be a very high price to pay 
for putting pressure on a single Member State. Interestingly enough, the Parliament’s 
position does not oppose this provision. The Parliament seems to feel that this is a 
dispute for the Commission and Council to settle between themselves. 
Art. 6(2)-(4) provides for the procedure for the withdrawal of authorisation. First, the 
Commission shall deliver a reasoned opinion to the Member State concerned on the 
necessary steps to be taken to comply with the Regulation. Based on this opinion, 
there are to be consultations as already envisaged for the notification procedure, 
allowing both sides to address “the concerns giving rise to a possible withdrawal of 
authorisation”.
135 It is only if these consultations fail to resolve the matter that the 
Commission shall act, by withdrawing the authorisation for the agreement by a 
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decision in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 15(2).The precise 
conditions of that withdrawal shall also be stated in the decision together with the 
requirement to take “appropriate action, and where necessary terminate the relevant 
agreement”.
136 
The Parliament’s position slightly amends the procedure. It adds a passage at the 
beginning of Art. 6, providing that the authorisation “shall be withdrawn where the 
Union has already ratified an agreement with the same third country relating to 
investment negotiated by the Commission.”
137 Thus, the Commission shall have no 
discretion for maintaining in force Member State BITs in case of overlaps with newly 
concluded Union agreements. With regard to the criteria for review, the Parliament’s 
position mirrors its stance on Art. 5, deleting the second criterion and limiting the third 
to serious obstacles to Union agreements.
138 
Furthermore, the Rapporteur proposed an amendment of Art. 6(2) to ensure a 
smoother operation of withdrawals, by directly providing that the consultations 
between the Commission and the Member State shall, where appropriate, directly 
“lead to a decision authorising the opening of negotiations in the sense of Article 
9.”
139 Such an amendment would be very helpful to speed up the procedure and 
allow Member States, where possible, to prevent gaps of protection arising from the 
potentially significant time span between a decision to withdraw authorisation and the 
completion of subsequently authorized negotiations for a new, EU law compatible 
BIT. 
The Parliament’s position takes up and expands this suggestion, providing that the 
consultations “may include the possibility for Member  States to renegotiate the 
agreement with the third country within an agreed period of time”.
140 Furthermore, in 
case of withdrawals, the Commission shall, where appropriate, immediately make a 
recommendation to the Council to authorise the negotiation of a Union agreement.
141  
 
 
                                                            
136 Ibid.,Art. 6(3). 
137 Parliament’s Position, supra note 2, Art. 6(1). 
138 Ibid., Art. 6(1)(a)-(c). 
139 Rapporteur SCHLYTER, Draft Report, supra note 97, p. 16, Amendment 18 (Art. 6(2)). 
140 Parliament’s Position, supra note 2, Art. 6(2). 
141 Ibid., Art. 6(3).   24 
5.5. Authorisation of Member States to amend or conclude new 
agreements(Art. 7-12) 
5.5.1.  Notification by the Member State 
The authorisation procedure for pre-existing agreements is complemented by a 
procedure for the conclusion of new agreements, set out in Arts. 7-12. The procedure 
is “inspired by the empowerment mechanism
142 set by Regulation No 662/2009 of 13 
July 2009 and No 774/2009 of 17 July 2009.
143 Its underlying ratio is that in the mixed 
framework consisting of “old” bilateral and “new” Union agreements, there may be 
cases in which one particular Member State is well placed to conclude a new 
agreement, while there is no outlook for the Union to do so. In such cases, the 
Member State may have recourse to this procedure. Furthermore, the procedure 
creates the framework in which Member States are to amend agreements, a 
measure that might be requested by the Commission in the course of its review 
under Art. 5. 
Member States shall notify the Commission as soon as they intend to  enter into 
negotiations and at least five calendar months before the envisaged beginning of 
formal negotiations.
144 The notification must include, in case of the negotiation of a 
new agreement, “relevant documentation and an indication of the provisions to be 
addressed in the negotiations, the objectives of the negotiations and  any other 
relevant information.”
145 In case of intended amendments to an existing agreement, 
the notification shall indicate the provisions to be renegotiated.
146  Should the 
Commission find the information transmitted together with the notification insufficient, 
it may request additional information.
147 
Furthermore, the Commission shall make the notification (and, on request, the 
accompanying  documentation), available to other Member States, subject  to the 
requirements of confidentiality.
148  By  notifying the other Member States of the 
intended agreement or amendment, the Commission involves them in the process of 
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monitoring the negotiations of bilateral agreements, replacing a “Commission v. 
Member State” paradigm  with  one of  “single  Member State v.  Union” in case of 
controversial agreements. The other Member States are thus granted at least five 
months to eventually voice their own concerns to the Commission. From a practical 
perspective, it is especially other Member States not having concluded any bilateral 
agreement with the third country in question that would have understandable 
concerns about the impact of a new bilateral agreement. 
To meet precisely these concerns, the Parliament’s position adds an additional 
provision requiring the Commission to “consult the other Member States within thirty 
days to determine whether there would be added value in an agreement of the 
Union”.
149 This active role of other Member States would strengthen the role of the 
Commission and might render its decisions more acceptable to the Member State 
concerned. 
5.5.2.  Review by the Commission 
After receiving the notification, the Commission shall, pursuant to Art. 9, 
“authorise the opening of formal negotiations unless it concludes that 
the opening of negotiations would 
(a) be in conflict with the law of the Union other than the 
incompatibilities arising from the allocation of competence between 
the Union and its Member States, or 
(b) undermine the objectives of negotiations underway or imminent 
between the Union and the third country concerned, or 
(c) constitute an obstacle to the development and the implementation 
of the Union's policies relating to investment, including in particular 
the common commercial policy.” 
Criteria (a) and (c) directly mirror the respective criteria under Arts. 5 and 6, while (b) 
adapts the issue of overlaps to the question of imminent negotiations. Thus, the 
criterion envisages cases where the bilateral negotiations would undermine 
negotiations underway or imminent between the Union and the third country 
concerned. It would be for the Commission to set out in its decision why, based on 
the information provided by the Member State, the opening of negotiations would 
constitute a threat to one of the interests contained in the three criteria.  
                                                            
149 Parliament’s Position, supra note 2, Art. 8(3a).   26 
Instead of an outright refusal to authorise, the  Commission also may require the 
Member State to include in such negotiation any appropriate clauses.
150  Such 
clauses may concern, for example, the conditions for termination of the agreement in 
the event of the subsequent conclusion of a Union agreement, provisions on capital 
transfers  or  most-favoured  nation treatment to ensure equal treatment of all EU 
investors.
151 
This would seem to reflect the principle of proportionality, requiring the Commission 
to pursue the objective of safeguarding the interests enshrined in the three conditions 
by the least restrictive means available. On the one hand, virtually any concern could 
be addressed by requiring the inclusion of appropriate clauses, thus apparently 
leaving little scope for outright refusals to authorise. On the other hand, if the clause 
necessary to sufficiently safeguard the Union’s interests would stand no chance of 
being accepted by the third country, it seems unlikely that the Commission would 
authorise the opening of negotiations conditioned upon including such clause. This is 
particularly so as some of the clauses that might be envisaged by the Commission 
(such as restrictions  of dispute settlement mechanisms or  exceptions to the free 
transfer of payments) would be highly contentious and function as “deal breakers” 
with third countries. 
The respective decisions shall be taken within 90 days of receipt of the notification or 
the receipt of the additional information. The decision shall be taken in accordance 
with the procedure referred to in Article 15(2), which refers to Decision 1999/468/EC 
on the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission.
152 
The Parliament’s position amends the criteria in Art. 9 on a number of accounts. 
First, it reduces the criterion concerning parallel negotiations to “negotiations 
underway”, removing the “imminent negotiations” envisaged in the original 
proposal.
153 Second, it adds an additional criterion for cases where the agreement 
would “not be in line with policies of the Union relating to investments”.
154 Third, it 
reiterates the higher threshold of constituting a serious obstacle to the conclusion of 
future Union agreements.
155 
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Furthermore, it adds a new  provision allowing the Commission to withhold 
authorisation if  “a simple majority of Member States indicate their interest  [...]  in 
concluding an investment agreement of the Union with the third country concerned” 
and instead to propose a negotiating mandate to the Council.
156 In doing so, the 
Commission shall  keep the European Parliament fully informed and take into 
consideration “the geographical priorities of the Union's investment strategy and the 
capacity of the Commission to negotiate a new agreement of the Union with the third 
country concerned”.
157 
The  amendment would contribute to  safeguard the rights of Member States 
“disadvantaged” in terms of investment protection and grant them an opportunity to 
influence the priorities of EU investment policy. By giving the disadvantaged Member 
States have a strong say, the question of creating an equal playing field between the 
Member States would be a perceived less as a discretionary policy of the 
Commission. This may help replace lengthy struggles between the Commission and 
the Council with an open and result-oriented debate in which Member States can 
articulate their investment policy needs. 
5.5.3.  Cooperation during the negotiations 
After authorising the opening of formal negotiations, the Commission “shall be kept 
informed of the progress and results throughout the different stages of negotiations 
and may request to participate in the negotiations”.
158 It remains to be seen how the 
Commission would use this right to request participation in practice. The explanatory 
memorandum suggests that the Commission would seek observer status in the 
negotiations “to ensure full transparency and consistency with the Union’s investment 
policy”.
159 Such participation may depend largely on the perceived willingness of the 
third country to grant the Commission a role in the negotiations. One the one hand, 
including  the Commission as a third party in already complicated bilateral 
negotiations may be a rather unattractive option, but on the other hand this may 
provide the third State with an opportunity to directly clarify and potentially settle 
contentious issues, especially as the Commission may otherwise  subsequently 
refuse to authorise the final agreement.  
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In case the Commission granted a conditional authorisation requesting the inclusion 
of certain clauses, it may be attractive for the negotiating Member State to directly 
involve the Commission in the negotiations and thereby  transfer the burden of 
obtaining consent to  those clauses by the third State to the Commission. In 
particular, this would help Member States avoid situations where third States use 
their consent to the Commission’s requested clause as a bargaining tool to force 
concessions in other fields of the agreement. 
The Parliament’s position concretizes and limits the participation rights by providing 
that the Commission may participate as an observer but only “as far as the exclusive 
competence of the Union is concerned.”
160 
Finally, Art. 11 regulates the procedure for authorising the final agreement. First, the 
Member State concerned shall notify the Commission of the outcome of negotiations 
and transmit the text of the agreement.
161 
Based on this notification, the Commission shall make an assessment as to whether 
the negotiated agreement does not conflict with any of the three criteria listed in Art. 
9(1) and additionally whether it  conflicts with the “appropriate clauses” if the 
Commission has required such pursuant to Article 9(2).
162 Only if the final agreement 
reached fulfils these requirements, the Commission shall authorise the Member State 
to sign and conclude the agreement.
163 This decision shall be taken within 90 days of 
receipt of the notification and all relevant additional information and in accordance 
with the procedure referred to in Article 15(2), thus under Decision 1999/468/EC.
164 
The Parliament’s position leaves the procedure unchanged but reduces the delay of 
90 days to 60 days
165  and changes the replaces the reference to Decision 
1999/468/EC by a reference to Regulation (EU) No 182/2011.
166 
Art. 12 provides for a review of the need for a continued application of the chapter in 
the light of the practice of authorisation, based on “quantitative and qualitative 
aspects of the negotiations and agreements authorised”.
167 
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5.6. Involvement of the Commission in the continued operation of the 
agreements (Art. 13) 
Art. 13(1) provides that Member States shall 
“inform the Commission without undue delay of all meetings which 
take place under the provisions of the agreement. The Commission 
shall be provided with the agenda and all relevant information 
permitting an understanding of the topics to be discussed. The 
Commission may request further information from the Member State 
concerned.” 
Thus, the Commission has to be kept informed concerning all meetings related to the 
operation of the agreement. Furthermore, the provision states that 
“Where an issue to be discussed might affect the implementation of 
the Union's policies relating to investment, including in particular the 
common commercial policy, the Commission can require the 
Member State concerned to take a particular position.” 
Thereby, the Regulation creates a distinction between general matters related to the 
agreement and those which might affect the  implementation of EU investment 
policy.
168  Concerning these, the Commission must not only be informed, it may 
determine the position which the Member State shall take on that question to ensure 
that there is no detrimental effect on EU investment policy. 
The following subparagraphs concern cases where a Member State is faced with 
accusations of having violated an agreement or requests for dispute settlement under 
the auspices of the agreement
169  and  cases where a Member State considers 
activating any relevant mechanisms for dispute settlement.
170 In the former case, the 
Member State shall inform the Commission without undue delay. In the latter case, 
the Member State shall seek the agreement of the Commission before activating the 
relevant dispute settlement mechanism. 
In both cases, Art. 13 provides that 
“[t]he Member State and the Commission shall fully cooperate 
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and take all necessary measures to ensure an effective defence (Art. 
13(2))  
in the conduct of procedures within the relevant mechanisms (Art. 
13(3))  
which may include, where appropriate, that the Commission 
participates in the procedure.” 
This provision aims to ensure that the Commission may be involved in dispute 
settlement procedures. The background to this may be the currently rather 
unsatisfactory  track record of Commission involvement in investment arbitration 
cases such as Eastern Sugar and Eureko. At least in the Eastern Sugar arbitration, 
this resulted from the fact that the Commission was only notified of the arbitration at a 
later stage and thus unable to assist the Member State in preparing a comprehensive 
defence strategy with regard to the EU law aspects of the dispute.
171 
By providing for its participation in secondary Union law, the Commission aims to 
strengthen its position and role in future investment arbitrations. The precise form of 
such participation is also not clear. The wording “participate in the procedure” leaves 
a significant margin of possibilities, reaching from providing support to the Member 
State preparing its defence, over the submission of separate observations (as the 
Commission already did in Eastern Sugar and Eureko) to an actual participation as a 
party in its own right. The latter option would correspond to the Commission’s 
suggestion that investment arbitration cases by foreign investors in the Union should 
be initiated against the Union itself as a sole defendant rather than the Member 
States.
172 However, this option is not compatible with ICSID arbitration, which is only 
available to States parties to the  ICSID convention.
173  Union accession to the 
convention would require a respective amendment of the convention which may be 
desirable, but is, despite strikingly optimist suggestions in that regard in the 
Commission Communication,
174 highly unlikely.
175 Consequently, the relevant dispute 
settlement mechanisms have been described as overall rather ill-suited for the EU.
176 
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Another interesting question is who would be the true beneficiary of such a stronger 
involvement of the Commission in dispute settlement procedures. Such involvement 
would raise difficult questions both with regard to the bearing of procedural costs and 
the right of the Commission to refuse or of Member States to request participation. 
Considering the significant administrative burden that might arise from participation in 
such proceedings,
177 it would seem necessary to grant the Commission a sufficient 
degree of discretion in determining whether and how extensively to participate in 
proceedings. 
Interestingly, Rapporteur Schlyter proposed replacing  the term “all necessary 
measures to ensure an effective defence which may include, where appropriate, that 
the Commission participates in the procedure” with “all necessary measures to 
ensure that the Commission participates in the procedure to the broadest extent 
possible”.
178 A possible explanation for this inclination to maximize the role of the 
Commission in dispute settlement procedures may be the desire of some MEPs to 
indirectly influence the proceedings. This would seem rather counterproductive, as 
such a move would entail a high risk of politicisation of investment disputes, thereby 
undermining one of the most important achievements of investment law.
179 
The Parliament’s position did not follow the suggestion, leaving the text of Art. 13 
unchanged, with exception of tautologically adding that the provisions shall apply to 
the activation of dispute settlement mechanisms “against a third country”.
180 
6.  Conclusions and outlook 
Overall, the Commission proposal constitutes an important first step towards an 
effective and balanced framework for the continuation of Member State BITs. It has, 
at the time of writing, been received positively by some
181  and with significant 
criticism
182 by other authors. 
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Three main conclusions can  already be  drawn. First, the  Commission aims for a 
gradual transition,
183 where Member State BITs shall be “progressively replaced by 
future agreements of the Union relating to the same subject matter”.
184 Meanwhile, 
the current legal framework founded on Member State BITs  can and will  largely 
remain in force. However, it may only do so under the terms, conditions and 
procedure  set out in the Regulation –  that is, under the watchful eye of the 
Commission. By maintaining in force the existing framework of Member State BITs, 
the Commission can concentrate its resources  on  negotiating the most essential 
agreements, thereby allowing the Union to “go where its investors would like to 
go”.
185 In the short term, this means focusing on negotiations for Comprehensive 
Economic and Trade Agreements with Canada, India, Singapore and Mercosur. In 
the short to medium  term, the Commission envisages a possible stand-alone 
investment agreement  with China and a comprehensive agreement possibly 
including foreign investment with Russia.
186 In itself, this strategy seems to properly 
balance the interests of individual Member States in maintaining BIT protection as 
long as necessary and the need to create the regulatory space for developing a 
comprehensive EU investment policy. 
Second, certain aspects of the proposed Regulation, such as the vague grounds for 
withdrawal of authorisation, would grant the Commission a very wide discretionary 
power and have thus already raised serious concerns. Member State representatives 
have expressed their opposition to such wide discretion, which would amount to “a 
permanent veto on Member States’ BITs”.
187  Should these concerns not be 
successfully addressed, the adoption of the Regulation may be delayed (perpetuating 
a climate of legal uncertainty) or lead, in its application, to disruptive  “inter-
institutional trench warfare”,
188 which might turn this new frontier for the CCP and its 
promising green fields into a no man’s land of lost opportunities. 
As the Parliament’s position and its amendments demonstrate, the increased role of 
the European Parliament
189 will have a decisive impact on the proposed Regulation 
and the future of Member State BITs. On the one hand, some MEPs are openly 
hostile to  the currently prevalent system of  investment  protection.  A prominent 
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example is  Rapporteur Schlyter himself, who referred to BIT’s as “neo-colonial” 
instruments for the exploitation of developing countries.
190 The central objective of 
these forces would be to push for a short-lived framework and make the continuation 
of Member State BITs conditional upon granting the European Parliament extensive 
influence over future negotiations of Union investment agreements. This influence 
would likely go beyond the influence national parliaments usually enjoy and 
consequently put the Commission at a disadvantage vis-à-vis national authorities 
negotiating investment agreements, thereby weakening the European bargaining 
power that this transfer of competence was meant to strengthen. 
One the other hand, it appears that a majority of MEPs  has a more balanced 
approach to investment protection. The Parliament’s position, which was a adopted 
with a majority of 345 to 246, rejects a series of highly problematic proposals by the 
Rapporteur, limits the originally too broadly formulated powers of the Commission for 
the review of BITs
191  and  also contains  genuinely promising improvements to 
strengthen cooperation between the institutions and the Member States. In particular 
the proposed Arts. 8(3a) and 9(3a) would allow “disadvantaged” Member States to 
play an active role in determining the future of Member State BITs. This would in turn 
allow the Commission to avoid a role as “prosecutor” of BITs and instead act as a 
mediator and coordinator, ensuring that the investment-related interests of all 
Member States are taken into account. 
The ball is now in the Council’s court, which held debates on the regulation on 13 
May 2011 and 16 March 2012. The Press Release of 13 May 2011 affirmed the 
Council’s determination to seek an agreement that would allow the regulation to enter 
into force “as soon as possible”.
192 The more recent Press Release of 16 March 2012 
stated that the Council “welcomed progress made so far, in particular the 
confirmation that the Commission services were in the process of establishing a new 
informal compromise that could bridge remaining differences between Parliament 
and Council.”
193 This process has taken place in the form of five informal trilogue 
meetings held with the Parliament. The Press Release concludes stating that “the 
parties are now aiming for an early second reading agreement.”
194 But almost one 
year after the adoption of the Parliament’s position and without any clear progress 
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towards an agreement, it seems the feared “inter-institutional trench warfare”
195 may 
already be under way, claiming legal certainty for Member State BITs as its first 
victim. 
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